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                                                  Abstract                                                                                                                                                                  
We analyse in a firm the possible choice between two systems of corporate governance: the one-tier board, a 
structure commonly used in the Anglo-American world, and the system of Codetermination, a two-tier board 
with the presence of workers' representatives in the supervisory board, a model commonly adopted by firms 
in Germany. The aim is to fill a gap present in the current literature, the absence of a mathematical model 
that explains how works the governance's system of Codetermination presents not only in the German world, 
but expanding in many other European countries, as a result of the recent EU directives, which emphasize 
the need to involve workers in company decisions. 
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                                                         1.Introduction                                                                                                                                                      
Corporate governance has become a major concern in recent years, probably due to meltdown 
scandals of several major companies around the world like Enron and Parmalat. In fact, the 
board in a system of governance performs different and complex functions and it is easy to 
understand how the effectiveness of its actions is fundamental to the growth and development 
of a firm. It should be noted also that the tasks of a board in a company represent the livelihood 
of its workers and their families (Stiglitz 1985, Hansmann 1990).    
 Also for the above scandals, following which thousands of people lost their jobs 
without having any direct responsibility, it seems essential that an additional agent in the firm, 
the worker, can take decisions on the development of the same firm through the expression 
of vote in the board because he/she brings human capital. Due to previous studies on the 
separation of ownership and control (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) this could have a 
double benefit for the company and the shareholders. On one hand, there is a stakeholder 
inside the company that can rarely get the chance to appropriate for private benefits (unlike 
the manager), for both the role it has and because his family livelihood depends on his salary, 
as we have already mentioned. On the other hand, "an important remark made by Holmström 
(1999) and by Roberts and Van den Steen (2000) is that when employees cannot participate in 
corporate decision making a likely response may be unionisation and/or strikes. There are 
many examples in corporate history where this form of employee protection has proved to be 
highly inefficient, often resulting in extremely costly conflict resolutions for the firm. Thus, in 
practice an important effect of employees representation on boards may be that employees’ 
human capital investments are better protected and that shareholders’ excessive urge to dismiss 
employees is dampened" (Polinsky and Shavell, 2007).     
 In the United States the law puts shareholders’ interests first as well as the common 
use in the United Kingdom. The board has a fiduciary duty to shareholders and firms tend to 
adopt a one-tier structure. Germany instead has a system of codetermination where larger 
firms have two boards: the supervisory and the management board. Half of the supervisory 
board’s members are elected primarily by workers and partly by labour unions. The other half 
represents shareholders. There is also a chairman who can cast tie-breaking votes if necessary, 
so his/her vote is very important. Although the shareholders have the option to vote down 
the workers, the vast majority of decisions are unanimous (Gorton and Schmid, 2004). So, the 
supervisory board represents the interests of the company as a whole. It elects, monitors and 
dismisses the management board, which operates the company. Supervisory boards typically 
have about 17 members, more than standard US and UK boards with an average respectively 
of 10.8 (Block and Gerstner, 2016) and 11.93 (Jungmann, 2006). The focus of the chapter is 
on how the German codetermination system works1 and the comparison with the most 
common system of governance, the single board. In this case the interests of workers are 
protected mainly through strikes and/or through trade union membership. However, the 
unions themselves may have conflicts of interest. Just think that in Italy a worker who wants 
to join a union must pay a registration fee deducted from the salary. This registration fee pays 
the wage of those who are supposed to guarantee the wellbeing of the workers. Often these 
fees are not adequately regulated by a national legislation, like in the case of the general 
secretaries of labour unions in Italy, where a person can get around five times more than what 
                                                          
1 For an extensive and update literature review about the theme of Codetermination see Forcillo (2017a). 
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is earned by an ordinary worker2. We could question if those people really do have an incentive 
to stop the possibility of more strikes or layoffs. If so, a worker would no longer need to pay 
a union fee. Given that, we have a potential conflict of interest among labour unions, firms 
and workers. So, the idea is that the presence of workers on the board could not only improve 
the quantity and quality of monitoring, but also at the same time, protect themselves through 
a direct democracy, without necessarily enrolling in a union and thus alleviate another potential 
conflict of interest. From a mathematical point of view, the chapter focuses on the size of the 
expected gains and consequently on different private benefits that large shareholder and 
manager could obtain depending on the investment project chosen. In the codetermination 
system, the large shareholder with the help of the workers, are involved in monitoring the 
management board, which has the option to choose the investment project. In the single 
board, the large shareholder does both functions. The basic framework in our model is from 
Graziano and Luporini (2012). They analyse if a system of governance with two distinct 
boards, one for selection of investment projects and one for monitoring, can reduce the 
conflict of interests between the large shareholder and the manager. The primary conclusion 
is that the large shareholder, despite his loss in private benefits, continues to maintain the 
incentives to monitor the manager, expecting higher return compared to the one-tier structure. 
However, Graziano and Luporini consider a dual board without the presence of workers 
inside, where the salary is normalized to zero. What we want to do then is to add the workers 
and their salary inside the model and check if their presence would differently affect the 
behaviour and choices of the large shareholder and manager, analysing how these could impact 
the firm's system.         
 There are in literature mathematical models that explain how the single board works 
(see e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), but the same does not happen to the German system. 
Therefore, the aim is to fill a gap present in the current literature, building first a mathematical 
model of corporate governance that explains the operations of the German system of 
codetermination and at the same time, check whether it is preferable to adopt this model or 
the classic Anglo-American model, i.e. a system without the presence of workers that can make 
decisions and carry out controls on the firm's management. The main finding is that 
codetermination could be beneficial for all agents in the firm, large shareholder included. 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The 
choice of monitoring intensity, by the large shareholder in the one-tier system and by the large 
shareholder and workers in the codetermination system, is analysed in section 3. Section 4 
illustrates the choice of effort in these structures of governance. Sections 5, 6 and 7 compare 
the two structures and present the main results. Finally, section 8 concludes. 
 
2. The model  
A large shareholder owns a large part 𝛼 of shares that giving him full control in a firm. The 
minority shareholders hold a portion of shares equal to (1 − 𝛼) and they are not represented 
                                                          
2 "Cisl, scoppia il caso dei mega-stipendi. Dirigente li denuncia ma verrà espulso", La Repubblica, August 
10, 2015. "Cisl, Raffaele Bonanni un segretario sindacale da 336mila euro l'anno", Il Fatto Quotidiano, 
October 30, 2014. 
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on the board3. The law gives to the large shareholder the right to choose between two models 
of governance, the sole board and the codetermination system. There are two main activities: 
selection of investment projects and monitoring. In the sole board both activities are 
implemented by a single board controlled by the large shareholder. In the codetermination 
system the two activities are separated: a management board is in charge to choose investment 
projects, monitoring activity instead is attributed to a supervisory board, half controlled by the 
large shareholder and half controlled by the representatives of the firm's workers. In the 
codetermination system, as the German law prescriptions, the same member cannot be present 
on both boards. The protection of workers is thus guaranteed by the direct representation on 
the board in the company rather than by the only presence of labour unions. 
 There are only two projects that can be chosen because they yield a non-negative 
return. In particular, projects 1 and 2 yield profit 𝜋 > 0, in the case of success, and 𝜋 = 0 in 
the case of failure. If a project is chosen, workers are hired. From the workers' perspective is 
fundamental that the project does not fail. In fact, if the project yields a positive return they 
receive a salary 𝑤 (where 𝑤 < 𝜋), otherwise they do not receive it and they are all fired (Faleye 
et al., 2005). So, for the worker is not important which of the two projects is chosen, but it is 
important that the firm has an adequate system of governance and that the project is managed 
by a capable manager. The fraction of capable (𝐻) and bad (𝐿) manager is 𝜆 and (1 −  𝜆) 
respectively. With probability 𝑝𝐻, the project is profitable if the manager is 𝐻 and with 
probability 𝑝𝐿   if the manager is 𝐿, where 𝑝𝐻 > 𝑝𝐿 > 0. Large shareholder and manager have 
different preferences due to the possibility of obtaining personal private benefits (Principal 
Agent Problem, see e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976), depending on the investment project 
undertaken. Private benefits are obtained even with 𝜋 = 0. There is no possibility to obtain 
private benefits for workers or minority shareholders. Project 1 produces private benefits   
𝐵 > 0 to the large shareholder and 𝑏1 to the manager. Project 2 gives private benefits 𝑏2 to 
the manager and zero to the large shareholder (remember: the large shareholder chooses the 
board structure). Since 𝑏2 > 𝑏1 > 0 the manager always prefers project 2. An important 
difference between the two systems of governance is that only in the sole board the large 
shareholder is able to force his favourite investment decision (project 1), but at the end of 
section 6 we show that the large shareholder could prefer, as well as the manager, project 2 
depending on the size of his expected gains.      
 The model develops over four periods and it is resolved by backward induction. At 
                                                          
3 We think that this represents the capital structure in Germany and in the UK and US. In fact Jungmann 
(2006) claims that "the latest statistics clearly show a recent trend that the ownership structure in the 
UK is no longer as dispersed as it once was. Consequently, whilst a couple of years ago the differences 
in the shareholder structures might have been a valid explanation for the results of comparative studies 
on the effectiveness corporate control, with respect to recent data for the UK and Germany, this is no 
longer the case". 
5 
 
𝑡 = 0, the large shareholder chooses the type of governance. If he chooses a single board, he 
is the only one sitting on the board. If he chooses a codetermination system, the workers 
nominate their representatives, so both large shareholder and workers sit on the supervisory 
board. The large shareholder in the one-tier structure, the large shareholder and the workers 
in codetermination, hire a manager in the job market. We assume that at the time of 
recruitment the type of manager is unobservable by large shareholder and workers giving them 
the right motivation to engage monitoring.       
 At 𝑡 = 1, manager and large shareholder exert their effort to become informed about 
investment projects. Information requires a cost. For the manager, it is 𝑒2/2 and he has 
probability 𝑒 to become informed. For the large shareholder, it costs ε2/2 and he has 
probability 𝜀𝑒 to become informed; so this probability is conditioned to the manager's activity. 
As in the German system, the only task for the workers is to perform monitoring activity. 
 At 𝑡 = 2, if a project is undertaken, the large shareholder in the single board, the large 
shareholder and workers in the codetermination system, start their monitoring activity on the 
manager. This activity is successful with probability 𝑀, at cost 𝑀2/2 for each agent. Obviously 
monitoring objective is to find out a low-ability manager in order to replace him, raising 
expected profit and expected salary.       
 At 𝑡 =  3, all the previous results are realized. Assumptions in the model are that 
𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿 < 1/(𝛼𝜋 + 𝑤)𝜆(1 − 𝜆), 𝐵 < 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑏2 < 1 and 𝑏2𝐾𝐿
𝑤 > 𝑏1𝐾𝐿. 
 
3. Monitoring  
There are two levels of monitoring intensity, the first one in the sole board and the second 
one in the codetermination system. With probability 𝑀, monitoring gives to the large 
shareholder/supervisory board the possibility to find out the manager’s ability. A 𝐻 manager 
is confirmed while an 𝐿 manager is fired. With probability (1 − 𝑀), monitoring is 
unsuccessful. In this case the manager is retained because the probability to hire a 𝐻 manager 
is the same as that of the incumbent being high ability. So, in the one-tier system the optimal 
level of monitoring derives from the maximization of the large shareholder's share of expected 
profit, net of the monitoring cost 𝑀2/2 
 
  max
𝑀
𝛼𝜋 {𝜆𝑝𝐻  +  (1 − 𝜆)[𝜆𝑝𝐻𝑀 +  (1 − 𝜆)𝑝𝐿𝑀 +  (1 − 𝑀)𝑝𝐿)]}  −   𝑀2/2 
 
where 𝑀2/2 is the monitoring cost. The large shareholder obtains a profit equal to 𝛼𝜋 with 
probability 𝑝𝐻 when the manager is 𝐻, independently from monitoring. After positive 
monitoring, when a 𝐿 manager is substituted with a good one, (1 − 𝜆)𝜆𝑝𝐻𝑀. With probability 
𝑝𝐿, when an 𝐿 manager is replaced with a 𝐿 one, (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜆)𝑝𝐿𝑀. Finally, after 
unsuccessful monitoring when the manager is 𝐿, (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝑀)𝑝𝐿 . From the FOC, we 
obtain the optimal level of monitoring equal to: 
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                                          𝑀∗ =  𝛼𝜋 (1 − 𝜆)𝜆 (𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿)                                    (1) 
                    
In the codetermination system instead, monitoring intensity results from the sum of the large 
shareholder's expected profit net his monitoring cost, plus workers' expected salary net their 
monitoring cost. In particular, the maximization problem for the large shareholder, conditional 
on the workers' monitoring level, is equal to: 
 
max
MLS
απ {λpH + (1 − λ)[λpHmin(MLS + Mw, 1) + (1 − λ)p
Lmin(MLS + Mw, 1) + min[1 − (MLS + Mw),1]p
L)]} − (MLS)
2/2 
 
From the FOC, we obtain: 
 
𝑀𝐿𝑆
∗ =  𝛼𝜋 (1 − 𝜆)𝜆 (𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿) 
 
The maximization problem for the workers, conditional on the large shareholder's monitoring 
level, is equal to: 
 
max
Mw
w {λpH + (1 − λ)[λpHmin(Mw+MLS, 1) + (1 − λ)p
Lmin(Mw + MLS, 1) + min[1 − (Mw + MLS),1]p
L)]} − (Mw)
2/2 
 
From the FOC, we obtain: 
 
𝑀𝑤
∗ =  𝑤 (1 − 𝜆)𝜆 (𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿) 
      
Then, the total level of monitoring on manager from the supervisory board is:  
 
𝑀∗∗ = 𝑀𝐿𝑆
∗ + 𝑀𝑤
∗ = (𝛼𝜋 + 𝑤) (1 − 𝜆)𝜆 (𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿)                            (2) 
          
So, the presence of the workers in the supervisory board allows a higher level of monitoring 
on the manager than the one-tier system. The reason is that workers, due to their tasks in the 
company and their daily working relationship with the manager, may have access to different 
types of information that the large shareholder alone may not have. Thus, in the 
codetermination system, a double level of control is created for the manager regarding 
different levels of information and it is easier to find out a bad manager. The presence of 
workers in the codetermination system acts as a strong signal for the less capable manager, 
who perceives the presence of another agent monitoring his tasks and consequently he changes 
his behaviour and level of effort. This result follows what we said before: the workers have a 
great interest that the project has positive returns and that therefore is managed by a good 
manager. Even more when compared to the large shareholder. In fact, he may obtain private 
benefits, while the only source of income for the workers is the wage received, only if the 
project is successful; if not, they are fired. However, workers have the same monitoring cost 
of large shareholder because while there is usually no problem for him in finding adequate 
representatives with advanced qualifications, such standards would be a problem for workers 
representatives that are unqualified to deal with matters such as accounting, finance and 
corporate strategy (Huse et al., 2009). 
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4. The choice of efforts 
In the single board (denoted by subscript 𝑆), the manager with probability 𝑒 and the large 
shareholder with probability 𝑒𝜀, exert efforts to have information about investment projects. 
With probability 𝑒(1 − 𝜀) project 2 is chosen (only the manager obtains information about 
the project). With probability (1 − 𝑒) no project is selected, generating zero profit and private 
benefits. In the codetermination system (subscript 𝐷𝑤) instead, only the manager exerts effort 
(probability 𝑒) because the project's choice is assigned to him. We define 𝐾𝐻 =  𝐾𝐻
𝑤 ≡  1, the 
probability to be retained for a manager 𝐻 in the single board and codetermination 
respectively. 𝐾𝐿  ≡  (1 − 𝑀
∗) and  𝐾𝐿
𝑤 ≡ (1 − 𝑀∗∗) are the analogous probability for a 
manager 𝐿, with 𝐾𝐿 > 𝐾𝐿
𝑤 due to the fact that     𝑀∗∗ > 𝑀∗. Then, the maximization problem 
for a manager of ability 𝑖 =  𝐻, 𝐿  is different in both structures. In particular, in the single 
board is equal to: 
 
   max 𝑒 [𝜀𝑆
∗𝑏1𝐾𝑖  + (1 − 𝜀𝑆
∗)𝑏2𝐾𝑖]  −  𝑒
2/2,   
      
      
From the FOC, we obtain: 
 
                                  𝑒𝑆
𝑖∗  =  [𝑏2  − 𝜀𝑆
∗(𝑏2 − 𝑏1)]𝐾𝑖             (3) 
           
In codetermination is equal to: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑒[𝑏2𝐾𝑖
𝑤]  − 𝑒2/2 
          𝑒 
 
From the FOC, we obtain: 
 
                    𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝑖∗  = 𝑏2𝐾𝑖
𝑤                                  (4) 
 
In (3) the managerial effort is negatively correlated to the effort of the large shareholder 𝜀𝑆
∗, 
because a greater value of 𝜀𝑆
∗ reduces the probability of carry out project 2. Since                   
𝐾𝐻 =  𝐾𝐻
𝑤   > 𝐾𝐿 > 𝐾𝐿
𝑤, it immediately follows that 𝑒𝑆
𝐻∗ > 𝑒𝑆
𝐿∗ and 𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐻∗ > 𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐿∗ , i.e. that a 𝐻 
manager exerts a higher level of effort than an 𝐿 one in both structures. For a 𝐻 manager, the 
effort does not depend on monitoring and he is always confirmed. The effort of an 𝐿  manager 
instead, negatively depends on monitoring, because 𝐾𝐿 and 𝐾𝐿
𝑤  depend on  𝑀∗ and 𝑀∗∗. 
Furthermore, since 𝐾𝐿 > 𝐾𝐿
𝑤, a bad manager has a bigger probability to be retained in the 
single board rather than codetermination due to the lower level of monitoring intensity 
implemented without the presence of workers that act in codetermination as added controllers. 
This is an important difference between the two systems of governance. 
 The large shareholder's effort depends on the chosen board. In codetermination, the 
effort is equal to zero because the project's choice is completely delegated to the manager. In 
the single board, however, he expects an effort from the manager 𝑒𝑆
∗ ≡  𝜆𝑒𝑆
𝐻∗ + (1 − 𝜆)𝑒𝑆
𝐿∗ 
that gives to the large shareholder a probability of high profit equal to: 
𝑒 
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𝑃𝑆 = 𝜆𝑒𝑆
𝐻∗𝑝𝐻  +  (1 − 𝜆)𝑒𝑆
𝐿∗[𝑝𝐿(1 − 𝑀∗) + (𝑝𝐻𝜆 +  𝑝𝐿(1 − 𝜆))𝑀∗]              (5)                
 
The analogous probability in codetermination, with an expected level of effort from the 
manager  𝑒𝐷𝑤
∗ ≡  𝜆𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐻∗ + (1 − 𝜆)𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐿∗ , is equal to: 
 
          𝑃𝐷𝑤 = 𝜆𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐻∗ 𝑝𝐻  +  (1 − 𝜆)𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐿∗ [𝑝𝐿(1 − 𝑀∗∗) + (𝑝𝐻𝜆 +  𝑝𝐿(1 − 𝜆))𝑀∗∗]          (6)  
 
A good manager has a 𝑝𝐻 probability of success. An 𝐿 manager has a 𝑝𝐿  probability of success, 
and he can be replaced (successful monitoring) or not replaced (unsuccessful monitoring) and 
the new manager can either be good (with probability 𝜆) or bad (with probability 1 − 𝜆). Then, 
the maximization problem of the large shareholder in the single board is equal to: 
 
max 𝑒𝑆
∗ [𝜀(𝐵 + 𝛼𝜋𝑃𝑆) + (1 − 𝜀)𝛼𝜋𝑃𝑆 − (𝑀
∗)2/2] − 𝜀2/2 
                           𝜀 
 
where 𝑒𝑆
∗𝜀(𝐵 + 𝛼𝜋𝑃𝑆) represents the probability for the large shareholder to be informed and 
then obtain expected profit plus private benefits from project 1; 𝑒𝑆
∗(1 − 𝜀)𝛼𝜋𝑃𝑆 represents 
the probability to obtain only expected profit in case project 2 is undertaken (only the manager 
is informed). From the FOC, we obtain: 
 
                    𝜀𝑆
∗ =  𝐵𝑒𝑆
∗                     (7) 
           
Solving the system (3) − (7) we have:  
 
                                                 𝜀𝑆
∗ = 
𝐵𝑏2𝐾
1+𝐵(𝑏2−𝑏1)𝐾
                     (8) 
      
 
                                                   𝑒𝑆
𝑖∗ = 
𝑏2𝐾𝑖
1+𝐵(𝑏2−𝑏1)𝐾
        i = 𝐾, 𝐿              (9) 
 
where 𝐾 ≡  𝜆𝐾𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐾𝐿. In particular, 𝜀𝑆
∗  is continuously increasing in 𝐵, ranging from 
𝜀𝑆
∗ = 0  when 𝐵 = 0, to 𝜀𝑆
∗ = 1/2  when 𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑑 = 
1
(𝑏1+𝑏2)𝐾
, to 𝜀𝑆
∗ → 1 when                               
𝐵 → 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≡ 1/𝑏1𝐾, (𝜕𝜀𝑆
∗/𝜕𝐵 >  0). 𝑒𝑆
𝑖∗, 𝑖 = 𝐾, 𝐿  instead is continuously decreasing in 𝐵, 
ranging from a minimum of 𝑏1𝐾𝑖, to a mid value of (
𝑏1+𝑏2
2
) 𝐾𝑖, to a maximum of 𝑏2𝐾𝑖. 
 
 
5. Single board versus codetermination  
Considering the level of effort (4) and (9) in order to compare the codetermination and one-
tier system, we have the following lemma. 
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Lemma: the level of effort exerted by the manager 𝐻 is higher in codetermination: 𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐻∗ ≥ 𝑒𝑆
𝐻∗, with      
𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐻∗ = 𝑒𝑆
𝐻∗ iff  𝐵 = 0 implying 𝜀𝑆
∗|𝐵=0 = 0. The level of effort exerted by the manager 𝐿 could be higher 
or smaller in the codetermination system. In particular, if 𝐵 = 0 or for low value of it, the level of effort exerted 
by the manager 𝐿 in codetermination is smaller than the sole board, 𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐿∗ < 𝑒𝑆
𝐿∗. If 𝐵 → 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥, the level of 
effort exerted in codetermination is greater than the sole board, 𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐿∗ > 𝑒𝑆
𝐿∗. So, with a manager 𝐿 the two 
structures cannot be equivalent, eDw
L∗ ≠ eS
L∗.   
Proof: 𝑒𝑆
∗𝑖 is continuously decreasing in 𝐵,  
∂eS
i
∂B
 = 
−𝑏2𝐾𝑖(𝑏2−𝑏1)𝐾
[1+𝐵(𝑏2−𝑏1)𝐾]
2  < 0 and 𝐾𝐿 > 𝐾𝐿
𝑤. 
 
The effort's level for a manager 𝐻 is independent of monitoring, so the presence of workers 
does not change his behaviour and the two structures could be equivalent. The effort of an 𝐿 
manager negatively depends on monitoring. Although private benefits could be equal to zero 
and the large shareholder has no interest to supervise, workers still have interest in monitoring 
the manager, so there is a higher level of control due to their presence. A manager 𝐿 knows 
that and in the codetermination system he understands that it is easier to be picked out. So, he 
changes his behaviour giving a lower level of effort. Only if 𝐵 → 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥, the manager 𝐿 loses 
the incentive to exert effort in the single board, because 𝑒𝑆
𝑖∗ is continuously decreasing in 𝐵. 
So, enhancing the private benefits for the large shareholder, the effort of an 𝐿 manager is 
higher in codetermination. As showed by Graziano and Luporini, we have a situation where 
the level of effort for a manager 𝐻 is higher than a manager 𝐿, but in our case the two structures 
are no longer equivalent with the presence of an 𝐿 manager, even if 𝐵 = 0, due to workers' 
presence on the board that increases the level of monitoring. This result is significant: since 
the large shareholder cannot know in advance the type of manager, by adopting the 
codetermination system he knows that the less capable manager always exerts a smaller effort 
for zero or low level of 𝐵 and so it is easier to find out the type of manager.  
 
 
 
6. Expected gains of large shareholder 
Comparing (5) and (6) we have a situation where the first term of (6) is greater than the first 
term of (5), with  𝜆𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝐻∗ 𝑝𝐻 =  𝜆𝑒𝑆
𝐻∗𝑝𝐻  iff  𝐵 = 0. So, in presence of a manager 𝐻, 𝑃𝐷𝑤 ≥ 𝑃𝑆. 
Looking at the second term, the probability of the outcome monitoring is always higher in the 
codetermination system, due to M∗∗ > M∗. Then, to be sure that PDw ≥ PS, we need to look 
at the effort of a manager 𝐿. In particular, for zero or a low level of B, the manager L knows 
that the large shareholder exerts zero or a low effort, consequently eS
L∗ > eDw
L∗  and PS could 
be bigger than PDw. For a higher level of B, a manager L has less incentive to exert effort in 
the single board, because the effort is continuously decreasing in B. So, an increase of private 
benefits for the large shareholder, diminish the manager's effort in the single board. It follows 
that eDw
L∗  > eS
L∗ and PDw is always bigger than PS. 
 The large shareholder preference, however, depends on his expected gains. Under the 
codetermination structure, the large shareholder wants to maximize his fraction of shares net 
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of monitoring cost and workers' expected salary. So, the expected gains of the large 
shareholder are equal to:  
                        
            𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤) =  𝑃𝐷𝑤𝛼(𝜋 − 𝑤) −  𝑒𝐷𝑤
∗ (𝑀𝐿𝑆
∗ )2/2                                 (10)  
    
In the sole board, the large shareholder exerts his effort and also obtains private benefits 𝐵. 
Then, in the one-tier structure his expected gains are equal to: 
 
  𝐸(𝐺𝑆) =  𝑃𝑆 𝛼(𝜋 − 𝑤) − 𝑒𝑆
∗(𝑀∗)2/2 + 𝜀𝑆
∗𝑒𝑆
∗𝐵 − (𝜀𝑆
∗)2/2          (11)                                        
                                      
where (𝑀𝐿𝑆
∗ )2/2 = (𝑀∗)2/2. In the Appendix, we prove the following proposition: 
 
Large shareholder preferences depend on the size of his private benefit 𝐵 and we can identify two cases according 
to its value. If  𝐵 ̅ > 𝐵 > ?̿? the large shareholder always prefers the single board; if instead ?̅? ≤  𝐵 ≤ ?̿? 
he prefers the codetermination structure. Hence two values exist, ?̅? and ?̿? between that the large shareholder 
always prefers the codetermination structure rather than the sole board. 
 
 
 
         Figure 1. Expected gains of the large shareholder. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the presence of a U-shaped between the choice in the hand of large shareholder 
between a system of codetermination and a single board when the dimension of private 
benefits is increasing. In particular, the large shareholder chooses the codetermination system 
if 𝐵 is not "too small", having the right motivation to monitor, without adopting opportunistic 
behaviour towards workers, and if it is not "too large" that he can appropriate for a large 
quantity of private benefits in the single board. If these conditions are respected, the large 
shareholder chooses the codetermination structure, giving to the workers the possibility to be 
represented on the board, protecting through a kind of direct democracy their rights and their 
place of work and safeguarding their life and that of their family. 
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7. Expected Gains fof other agents 
Let us focus on the expected gains of other agents in the model. In particular, for the minority 
shareholders in the sole board and codetermination system, they are respectively equal to: 
                                              𝑃𝐷𝑤[(1 − 𝛼)(𝜋 − 𝑤)]                                      (12) 
 
     𝑃𝑆[(1 − 𝛼)(𝜋 − 𝑤)]                         (13) 
If the conditions in section 6 are respected, 𝑃𝐷𝑤 >  𝑃𝑆 and the expected gains are higher in 
the codetermination system. In this situation, there is also a greater protection of the minority 
shareholders' interests as claimed by Fauver and Fuers (2006) and it may also reduce the 
conflict of interests between large and minority shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
The manager can choose among two possible investment projects, getting private benefits  𝑏1 
from project 1 (with probability 𝜀𝑆
∗𝑒𝑆
∗), and 𝑏2 from project 2, with probability 𝑒𝑆
∗(1 − 𝜀𝑆
∗). 
Given these conditions the manager's expected gains in the single board are equal to: 
 
             𝑒𝑆
∗[𝜀𝑆
∗𝑏1  +  (1 −  𝜀𝑆
∗)𝑏2]  − (𝑒𝑆
∗)2/2           (14) 
where: 
   (𝑒𝑆
∗)2/2 = effort's cost for the manager in the single board 
 
In codetermination, the expected gains are equal to:  
                 𝑒𝐷𝑤
∗ 𝑏2 − (𝑒𝐷𝑤
∗ )2/2                                     (15) 
where: 
       (𝑒𝐷𝑤
∗ )2/2 = effort's cost for the manager in codetermination 
If we compare (14) and (15) we note that the manager prefers a governance's system of 
codetermination, because the choice of the project is entirely delegated to him, who then 
always chooses project 2 when informed, obtaining private benefits equal to 𝑏2 greater than 
𝑏1. As shown in section 4, in the case of sole board the manager's effort is negatively correlated 
to the large shareholder's effort; therefore, in the sole board there is uncertainty on the amount 
of private benefits that the manager can appropriate. In codetermination, however, he gets for 
sure private benefits equal to 𝑏2 when informed.       
 Finally, the workers' expected gains in codetermination and in the one-tier system are 
respectively equal to 𝑤𝑃𝐷𝑤  − 𝑒𝐷𝑤
∗ (𝑀𝑤
∗ )2/2  and 𝑤𝑃𝑆. In the first case, the workers incur in 
the monitoring cost. It is the cost to be paid to have the possibility to make decisions in the 
firm, a cost that they do not support in the sole board. So, for the workers is important that 
the probability of generating gains in the codetermination system, 𝑃𝐷𝑤, is large enough 
compared to 𝑃𝑆, to offset this cost, and/or to be able to do it, the benefits that workers (e.g. a 
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smaller likelihood of layoffs, strikes, unions power) enjoy in this role inside the board in the 
firm. So, as hypothesized by Fauver and Fuers, there is like an inverted U-shaped (figure 2) 
linked to the benefits that the workers obtain with a codetermination system. In the initial part 
of the curve not only the benefits for the company increase, but also those for the workers in 
terms of more involvement in the company operations and less probability of layoffs and 
strikes. Nevertheless, the workers have a monitoring cost to pay in order to have such benefits, 
a cost that is not supported in the single board. As long as this cost is not so high, the workers 
prefer the codetermination system because the benefits exceed the disadvantages. When the 
cost is too high, the workers prefer the sole board, because the cost can offset any advantages 
obtained. For this reason in the second part of the curve there may be also a decrease of 
benefits for the company because the workers could acquire too much power and thinking 
more about their salary than the value of the firm at the shareholders' expense. Furthermore 
in this part of the curve are also increasing the private benefits of the large shareholder, so he 
could be incentivised to activate only a low level of monitoring acting as free-rider with the 
intent of taking excessive advantage from the workers.  
 
 
   Figure 2. Inverted U-shaped 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
The codetermination system, like a standard dual board, has the benefit of valuing the role of 
managers, but at the same time, there is also a higher intensity of monitoring. The prices to be 
paid for the large shareholder are two: the exclusion from the management board and therefore 
from the investment decisions and the presence of workers on the supervisory board. 
However, the large shareholder could choose a codetermination system due to a greater return 
in expected gains. Graziano and Luporini (2012) show a similar conclusion in a dual board 
case without workers, analysing only the large shareholder's expected gains. The total welfare 
of the firm's system without workers is analyzed by Forcillo (2017b). 
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 This chapter shows that by adopting the codetermination system, which provides the 
inclusion of workers with the large shareholder on the board, and by analysing not only his 
expected gains, but those of all agents in the model, everyone has the opportunity to obtain 
higher expected gains, without this affecting the well-being of others, in a situation closer to 
an allocation Pareto optimal. This result is significant: it means that the same large shareholder 
could decide to implement such structure. Or, if he may get a very large quantity of private 
benefits by choosing the one-tier structure, an external controller (such as the Government) 
may decide to intervene, correcting any distortion of the governance system and impose by 
law, the board's structure and the conditions which guarantee a higher social welfare in the 
firm system. Furthermore, if we refer to European policy, at the same time, the adoption of a 
system of codetermination follows the guidelines set out by the European Union (Simons and 
Kluge, 2004). In addition, considering an analysis on a larger scale and taking into account 
other major world economic, such as Italy, the US and UK, this gives to the workers the 
possibility to be directly involved in the important business decisions, in a kind of direct 
democracy in the company. This may ensure a better quality of work for the workers and for 
the firm itself, in terms of reduction of layoffs, more involvement for the workers and thus 
the possibility to have wages for their family livelihood, and in terms of a decrease in collective 
strikes and production block for the company. 
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Appendix.  
 
To prove the part on expected gains, we can rewrite 𝐸(𝐺𝑆)  and 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤) as follows: 
 
                         𝐸(𝐺𝑆) = 𝛼[𝜆JHeS
H∗ + (1 − λ)JLeS
L∗] + (εS
∗ )2/2                                (16) 
 
where  JH ≡ (π − 𝑤)p
H − (𝑀∗)2/2α 
 JL ≡   (π − 𝑤)[p
L(1 − 𝑀∗) + (pHλ + pL(1 − λ)) 𝑀∗] − (𝑀∗)2/2α 
 
 
                        𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤) =  𝛼[λYHeDw
H∗ + (1 − λ)YLeDw
L∗ ]                                   (17) 
 
where YH ≡  (π − 𝑤)p
H − (𝑀𝐿𝑆
∗ )2/2α 
 YL ≡   (π − 𝑤)[p
L(1 − 𝑀∗∗) + (pHλ + pL(1 − λ)) 𝑀∗∗] − (𝑀𝐿𝑆
∗ )2/2α 
 
Note that: 
(𝑀𝐿𝑆
∗ )2/2α = (𝑀∗)2/2α , so 𝐽𝐻  =  𝑌𝐻 and we call both 𝐽𝐻. 𝑌𝐿  >  𝐽𝐿 because 𝑀
∗∗  >  𝑀∗. 
 
 
Taking the derivative of (16) with respect to 𝐵 we obtain: 
 
𝜕𝐸(𝐺𝑠)
𝜕𝐵
= α [JHλ
−b2KH(b2−b1)K
[1+B(b2−b1)K]2
+ JL(1 − λ)
−b2KL(b2−b1)K
[1+B(b2−b1)K]2
+ εS
∗ −b2K
[1+B(b2−b1)K]2
] = 
 
b2K
[1 + B(b2 − b1)K]2
{−α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) + εS
∗ } 
 
b2K
[1+B(b2−b1)K]2
 is always positive. So the sign depends on α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1). 
 
We can have four cases: 
 
1) if α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) ≥ 1, the function is continuously decreasing from 
𝐸(𝐺𝑆)𝐵=0, touching once 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤). Red curve in figure 3; 
 
2) if α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) < 1, the function is first decreasing for low values 
of 𝐵 when α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) > εS
∗  and increasing for higher values of 𝐵 
when α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) < εS
∗ , never touching 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤). Yellow curve in 
figure 3; 
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3) if α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) < 1, the function is first decreasing for low values 
of 𝐵 when α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) > εS
∗  and increasing for higher values of 𝐵 
when α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) < εS
∗ , touching once 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤). Orange curve in 
figure 3; 
 
4) if α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) < 1 the function is first decreasing for low values of 
𝐵 when α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) > εS
∗  and increasing for higher values of 𝐵 when 
α[λJHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL](b2 − b1) < εS
∗ , touching twice 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤). Green curve in figure 3.  
 
 In the fourth case to be sure that two values of 𝐵 exist, we need two conditions. We 
know that 𝐸(𝐺𝑆)𝐵=0 > 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤) because JL > YL
(1−𝑀∗∗)
(1−𝑀∗)
 . 𝑒𝐷𝑤
𝑖 = 𝑏2𝐾𝑖
𝑤 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿 where 
𝐾𝐻
𝑤 = KH = 1 ,so we call both KH. εS
∗ = 0 when 𝐵 = 0; if 𝐵 → 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 for εS
∗ → 1, 
𝑒𝑆
𝑖  asymptotically tends to 𝑏1𝐾𝑖. For a mid value of private benefits, 𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑑 =
1
(𝑏1+𝑏2)𝐾
 ,        
εS
∗ = 1/2 and 𝑒𝑆
𝑖 = (
𝑏1+𝑏2
2
) 𝐾𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿. So, we can rewrite 𝐸(𝐺𝑆)𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑑 , 𝐸(𝐺𝑆)𝐵→𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 
𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤) as: 
 
𝐸(𝐺𝑆)𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑑 = 𝛼 (
𝑏1+𝑏2
2
) [𝜆JHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL] +
1
8⁄  
 
𝐸(𝐺𝑆)𝐵→𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝛼𝑏1[𝜆JHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL] +
1
2⁄  
 
𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤) =  𝛼𝑏2[𝜆JHKH + (1 − λ)YL𝐾𝐿
𝑤] 
 
 
For 𝐵 = 𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑑, 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤) > 𝐸(𝐺𝑆)𝐵=𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑑, or 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤) − 𝐸(𝐺𝑆)𝐵=𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑑 > 0: 
 
𝛼𝑏2[𝜆JHKH + (1 − λ)YL𝐾𝐿
𝑤] −  𝛼 (
𝑏1+𝑏2
2
) [𝜆JHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL] −
1
8⁄ >  0 
 
For 𝐵 → 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝐸(𝐺𝑆)𝐵→𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤) , or 𝐸(𝐺𝑆)𝐵→𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑤) ≥ 0: 
 
𝛼𝑏1[𝜆JHKH + (1 − λ)JLKL] +
1
2⁄ −  𝛼𝑏2[𝜆JHKH + (1 − λ)YL𝐾𝐿
𝑤]  ≥  0 
 
So, when α[𝜆JHKH(𝑏2 − 𝑏1) + (1 − λ)(2b2YLKL
w − (b2 + b1)JLKL)] >
1
4⁄ , and 
α[𝜆JHKH(𝑏2 − 𝑏1) + (1 − λ)(b2YLKL
w − b1JLKL)] ≤
1
2⁄ , ?̅? and ?̿? both exist. 
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                    Figure 3. Trend of 𝑬(𝑮𝑺). 
 
